Friday, April 29, 2016

Concept Formation in Children by Vygotskii

The notes below are taken from the psychologist Vygotskii's work called Thought and Language. He did a series of experiments and meditations with children and adolescents in search for insights into conceptualization and language.

I do not agree with some of his use of language, e.g. I would not describe concept as a formation. This is a misnomer and misleading use of language. Concept has no form and does not form. He also failed to understand that the word either refers to an object or to a concept even though he was sitting right on top of this insight (no doubt his failure is due to poor language usage, for Form is wed to Object). Still these are some valuable notes taken from his book. They add insight into the Object--Concept dichotomy which is so crucial in the work of philosophy and physics.

This book is considered the landmark of cognitive science.

Thought and Language by Vygotskii

From Chapter: Concept Formation in Children

Concept formation [misnomer] is the result of a complex activity in which all basic intellectual functions take part. The process cannot, however, be reduced to association, attention, imagery, inference, or determining tendencies. They are all indispensable, but they are insufficient without the use of the sign, or word, as the means by which we direct our mental operations, control their discourse, and channel them toward the solution of the problem confronting us.

Concept Formation

Phase 1

The young child takes the first step toward concept formation when he puts together a number of objects in an unorganized congeries, or “heap”, in order to solve a problem that we adults would normally solve by forming a new concept.

Phase 2

The second major phase on the way to concept formation comprises many variations of a type of thinking that we shall call thinking in complexes. In a complex, individual objects are united in the child’s mind not only by his subjective impressions but also by bonds actually existing between objects.
. . .
Remains of complex thinking persist in the language of adults. Family names are perhaps the best example of this. Any family name, “Petrov,” let us say, subsumes individuals in a manner closely resembling that of the child’s complexes. The child at that stage of development thinks in family names, as it were; the universe of individual objects becomes organized for him by being grouped into separate, mutually related “families.”

Phase 3

Complex thinking of the second type consists in combing objects or the concrete impressions they make on the child into groups that closely resemble collections. Objects are placed together on the basis of some one trait in which they differ and consequently complement one another.

Phase 4

After the collection stage of thinking in complexes, we must place the chain complex—a dynamic, consecutive joining of individual links into a single chain, with meaning carried over from one link to the next. . . . An object included (in a chain complex) because of one of its attributes enters the complex not just as the carrier of that one trait but as an individual, with all its attributes. . . In complexes, the hierarchical organization is absent: All attributes are functionally equal.

Phase 5

Because the chain complex is factually inseparable from the group of concrete objects that form it, it often acquires a vague and floating quality.
. . .
The diffuse complex is marked by the fluidity of the very attribute that unites its single elements.
. . .
To go with a yellow triangle, for example, a child would in our experiments pick out trapezoids as well as triangles, because they made him think of triangles with their tops cut off.
. . .
Complexes resulting from this kind of thinking are so indefinite as to be in fact limitless.

Phase 6

To complete the picture of complex thinking, we must describe on more type of complex—the bridge, as it were, between complexes and the final, highest stage in the development of concept formation.
. . .
We call this type of complex the pseudo-concept because the generalization formed in the child’s mind, although phenotypically resembling the adult concept, is psychologically very different from the concept proper; in its essence, it is still a complex.
. . .
In the experimental setting, the child produces a pseudo-concept every time he surrounds a sample with objects that could just as well have been assembled on the basis of an abstract concept.
. . .
Pseudo concepts predominate over all other complexes in the preschool child’s thinking for the simple reason that in real life complexes corresponding to word meanings are not spontaneously developed by the child: The lines along which a complex develops are predetermined by the meaning a given word already has in the language of adults.
. . .
The language of the environment, with its stable, permanent meanings, points the way that the child’s generalizations will take. But, constrained as it is, the child’s thinking proceeds along this preordained path in the manner peculiar to his level of intellectual development. The adult cannot pass on to the child his mode of thinking. He merely supplies the ready-made meaning of a word, around which the child forms a complex—with all the structural, functional, and genetic peculiarities of thinking in complexes, even if the product of his thinking is in fact identical in its content with a generalization that could have been formed by conceptual thinking. The outward similarity between the pseudo-concept and the real concept, which makes it very difficult to “unmask” this kind of complex, is a major obstacle in the genetic analysis of thought.
. . .
The pseudo-concept serves as the connecting link between thinking in complexes and thinking in concepts. It is dual in nature: a complex already carrying the germinating seed of a concept. Verbal intercourse with adults thus becomes a powerful factor in the development of the child’s concepts. The transition from thinking in complexes to thinking in concepts passes unnoticed by the child because his pseudo-concepts already coincide in content with the adult’s concepts.
. . .
Complex formation is also responsible for the peculiar phenomenon that one word may in different situations have different or even opposite meanings as long as there is some associative link between them. Thus, a child may say before for both before and after, or tomorrow for both tomorrow and yesterday. We have here a perfect analogy with some ancient languages—Hebrew, Chinese, Latin—in which one word also sometimes indicated opposites. The Romans, for instance, had one word for high and deep. Such a marriage of opposite meanings is possible only as a result of thinking in complexes.

Phase 7

The principle function of complexes is to establish bonds and relationships. Complex thinking begins the unification of scattered impressions; by organizing discrete elements of experience into groups, it creates a basis for later generalizations.
. . .
But the advanced concept presupposes more than unification. To form such a concept it is also necessary to abstract, to single out elements, and to view abstracted elements apart from the totality of the concrete experience in which they are embedded. In genuine concept formation, it is equally important to unite and to separate: Synthesis must be combined with analysis. Complex thinking cannot do both. Its very essence is overabundance, overproduction of connections, and weakness in abstraction.

Phase 8

During the next stage in the development of abstraction, the grouping together of objects on the basis of maximum similarity is superseded by grouping on the basis of a single attribute, e.g. only round objects or only flat ones. . . we shall call such formations potential concepts.
. . .
Only the mastery of abstraction, combined with advanced complex thinking, enables the child to progress to the formation of genuine concepts. A concept emerges only when the abstracted traits are synthesized anew and the resulting abstract synthesis becomes the main instrument of thought. The decisive role in this process, as our experiments have shown, is played by the word, deliberately used to direct all the part processes of advanced concept formation.

Phase 9

The transitional character of adolescent thinking becomes especially evident when we observe the actual functioning of the newly acquired concepts. Experiments specially devised to study the adolescent’s operations with concepts brings out, in the first place, a striking discrepancy between his ability to form concepts and his ability to define them.
. . .
The adolescent will form and use a concept quite correctly in a concrete situation but will find it strangely difficult to express that concept in words, and the verbal definition will, in most cases, be much narrower than might have been expected from the way he used the concept. The same discrepancy occurs also in adult thinking, even at very advanced levels.
. . .
Much more difficult than the transfer itself is the task of defining a concept when it is no longer rooted in the original situation and must be formulated on a purely abstract plane, without reference to any concrete situation.
. . .
When the process of concept formation is seen in all its complexity, it appears as a movement of thought within the pyramid of concepts, constantly alternating between two directions, from the particular to the general, and from the general to the particular.

Our investigation has shown that a concept is formed, not through interplay of associations, but through an intellectual operation in which all the elementary mental functions participate in a specific combination. This operation is guided by the use of words as the means of actively centering attention, of abstracting certain traits, synthesizing them, and symbolizing them by a sign.

The processes leading to concept formation develop along two main lines. The first is complex formation: The child unites diverse objects in groups under a common “family name”; this process passes through various stages. The second line of development is the formation of “potential concepts,” based on singling out certain common attributes. In both, the use of the word is an integral part of developing processes, and the word maintains its guiding function in the formation of genuine concepts, to which these processes lead.
. . .

Miscellaneous from other chapters of the book:

The meaning of a word represents such a close amalgam of thought and language that it is hard to tell whether it is a phenomenon of speech or a phenomenon of thought. A word without meaning is an empty sound; meaning, therefore is a criterion of “word,” its indispensable component. . . .
Word meanings are dynamic rather than static formations. They change as the child develops. . .
. . .
The relation of thought to word and word to thought is not a thing but a process. . .
. . .
Every thought tends to connect something with something else, to establish a relationship between things.

Meaning and Definition

Here are some interesting quotes I've collected over the past year or two in regards to meaning and definition. The word meaning originates in the German Language, from the word meinen which is still used today. It is translated as thinking or intention. It almost seems synonymous with 'intentional thinking'. The word 'definition' has its roots in Latin. Both names refer to ideas and have to do with a human's relation to his own thought, or what is happening in via his brain.

From Thought and Language (1986) by Lev Vygotskii

"The meaning of a word represents such a close amalgam of thought and language that it is hard to tell whether it is a phenomenon of speech or a phenomenon of thought. A word without meaning is an empty sound; meaning, therefore is a criterion of “word,” its indispensable component. . ." [note: in other sections he equated "word" with concept. All words first and foremost reference concepts and then, secondarily refer to an object or a concept).

"The adolescent will form and use a concept quite correctly in a concrete situation but will find it strangely difficult to express that concept in words, and the verbal definition will, in most cases, be much narrower than might have been expected from the way he used the concept. The same discrepancy occurs also in adult thinking, even at very advanced levels."

From The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism (1923) by Ogden and Richards

"Firstly, do we define things or words? To decide this point we have only to notice that if we speak about defining words we refer to something very different from what is referred to, meant, by 'defining things.' When we define words we take another set of words which may be used with the same referent as the first, i.e., we substitute a symbol which will be better understood in a given situation. With things, on the other hand, no such substitution is involved. A so-called definition of a horse as opposed to the definition of the word 'horse,' is a statement about it enumerating properties by means of which it may be compared with and distinguished from other things."
. . .
"They [definitions] are relevant to some purpose or situation, and consequently are applicable only over a restricted field or 'universe of discourse.' For some definitions, those of physics, for instance, this universe is very wide."
. . .
"And here we pause at the very pertinent question: "What then from the psychological point of view is this MEANING?" The answer is given without hesitation and in italics-" From the psychological point of view, MEANING is context." To explain: In every perception, or group of sensations and images, "the associated images form as it were a context or 'fringe' which binds together the whole and gives it a definite MEANING," and it is this "fringe of MEANING that makes the sensations not 'mere' sensations but symbols of a physical object."

From Ontology of Language: What is a Concept? by Fattie
"Furthermore, these objects of our environment are also used in associations which explicitly define and provide some intended meaning, like a type of motion. In the above example[the ball fell to the floor.], the word “fell” is a dynamic concept which describes and gives meaning to the relation between 2 objects, specifically, the motion between the ball and the floor. It is impossible to define the word “fell” without associating at least 2 objects. For example, you CANNOT define “fell” by simply referencing the ball by itself without any other relation. You cannot even imagine a lone ball falling in a Universe that is comprised of a single lonely ball. Even the dynamic concepts of energy, mass, time, field or force cannot even be imagined or conceptualized on a lonely object. Not even God Almighty can conceptualize them! Now you should be able to understand exactly why ENERGY, MASS, TIME, FIELD and FORCE do not exist, they never have....and they never will."

"Meaning is what WE explicitly define in the relation within each concept. Concepts don’t magically self-acquire meaning nor are they devoid of meaning, despite what some people will have you believe."

From Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998) by Jerry Fodor

"Chapter 3 remarked that it’s pretty clear that if we can’t define “doorknob”, that can’t be because of some accidental limitation of the available metalinguistic apparatus; such a deficit could always be remedied by switching metalanguages. The claim, in short, was not that we can’t define “doorknob” in English, but that we can’t define it at all. The implied moral is interesting: if “doorknob” can’t be defined, the reason that it can’t is plausibly not methodological but ontological; it has something to do with what kind of property being a doorknob is. [FORM, form, form!!!] If you’re inclined to doubt this, so be it; but I think that you should have your intuitions looked at.
. . .
It’s sometimes said that doorknobs (and the like) have functional essences: what makes a thing a doorknob is what it is (or is intended to be) used for. So maybe the science of doorknobs is psychology? Or sociology? Or anthropology? Once again, believe it if you can. In fact, the intentional aetiology of doorknobs is utterly transparent: they’re intended to be used as doorknobs. I don’t at all doubt that’s what makes them what they are, but that it is gets us nowhere. For, if DOORKNOB plausibly lacks a conceptual analysis, INTENDED TO BE USED AS A DOORKNOB does too, and for the same reasons. And surely, surely that can’t, in either case, be because there’s something secret about doorknobhood that depth psychology is needed to reveal? No doubt, there is a lot that we don’t know about intentions towards doorknobs qua intentions; but I can’t believe there’s much that’s obscure about them qua intentions towards doorknobs.

Look, there is presumably something about doorknobs that makes them doorknobs, and either it’s something complex or it’s something simple. If it’s something complex, then ‘doorknob’ much have a definition, and its definition must be either “real” or “nominal” (or both). If ‘doorknob’ has a nominal definition, then it ought to be possible for a competent linguist or analytical philosopher to figure out what its nominal definition is. If ‘doorknob’ has a real definition, then it ought to be possible for a science of doorknobs to uncover it. But linguists and philosophers have had no luck defining ‘doorknob’ (or, as we’ve seen, anything much else). And there is nothing for a science of doorknobs to find out. The direction this is leading in is that if ‘doorknob’ is undefinable, that must be because being a doorknob is a primitive property. But of course, that’s crazy. If a thing has doorknobhood, it does so entirely in virtue of others of the properties it has. If doorknobs don’t have hidden essences or real definitions, that can’t possibly be because being a doorknob is one of those properties that things have simply because they have them."

[the single primary property he is looking for is form or shape. It is impossible to define an object, all one can do is point to it. The 'word' object references that which has form. Form is in inherent property humans have conceived so as to classify any and all objects as opposed to concepts. Meaning, definition, etc. arises from relations between objects, even if a human is relating an object to his or her self, or form or another form or idea as in the act of naming or symbolizing]

From What is a Scientific Definition? by Fattie

"A definition is simply a description of the conceptual relations between the objects invoked within the specified context of a term. Definitions place limitations on the extent or usage on the terms in question for the purposes of avoiding ambiguities, circularities and contradictions. Only then can the terms have consistent meaning in one’s dissertation. All concepts describe the relations between the objects they invoke; and this is their intrinsic meaning. As such, all concepts are necessarily defined, whether we like it or not."

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

Inertial Mass and All Things

Modern inertial mass is a seminal concept in Newton's work. Inertial mass refers to a static concept. A picture. Inertial mass refers to an object's resistance to being pushed and pulled by other objects in the vicinity. In this context we could replace the word 'object' with 'atom' or 'proton'. Then we have to ask ourselves how is it that this object, this atom, resists being pushed or pulled by other objects in the vicinity? The reasonable explanation seems that an atom's resistance originates in all the atoms of the Universe gently nudging that atom from all directions . . . toward them. AS WELL that sample atom gently nudging on all atoms of the Universe toward it. All the atoms of the Universe are in a constant tension with one another. When an atom assumes a succession of locations all atoms of the Universe gently nudge on it and it gently nudges on all atoms. 

When a proton (or H atom) moves in a given direction by the proton's in the vicinity, for example in what we call gravity, the same is tugged in the opposite direction by all other atoms of the Universe. Inertial mass is always in the direction(s) opposite the net effect of gravity. It seems very reasonable to assume that all the atoms of the Universe are physically connected by some sort of fundamental object that is inherent to the atoms, to the very protons themselves . . . ALL OF THEM. 

Newton came very close to this conclusion when since he thought that the resistive forces were innate to the object. He uses the expression "innate force possessed by an object" or "innate resistive forces". What he failed to do is explain HOW or WHY these resistive forces are innate to all objects, and in our modern context all atoms. He did not understand the Form of an atom. An atom derives, or assumes it's Form from the same object that performs the work of light, gravity and inertia to and from all atoms. We could call this a double helix EM Thread, and there is a grand scope of implications that such an assumption entails. The object that performs the work of light to and from all atoms has wholly unique properties (such as the ability to superpose, overlap, or intersect without disturbance up to some critical anomaly or density). These properties are assumed by the atom itself for the atom seems to assume its Form from the same object. This is one of the reason's why we have seemingly inexplicable anomalies at the quantum scale.

When two objects, say stars, like the Sun and the Earth come close, the number of these double helix thread connections INCREASES, exponentially in effectiveness. A decrease in distance, between the two sample objects in Newton's equation, say Earth and Sun, spontaneously generates a geometric increase in the number of effective thread like EM helices connecting all the atoms of these two objects. The M1 and M2 in Newton's equation represent the number of potential connections. When Earth and Sun are theoretically separated at great distances, beyond the inverse square regime, the nudging between the two is unidirectional and this would perhaps almost be the same between Earth and a star in Andromeda. Ineffective in terms of the concept of gravity, but effective in terms of inertia. When the two stars come close enough, many pairs of atoms are in a sideways tension with one another at various angles. The tension is multi-directional, a sideways tension from multiple locations. Effective. The 'innate resistive forces' are happening at various angles between the two objects considered in the equation and used for explanation.  The net effect of local tension (gravity) is as if objects are being pulled straight down toward one another, but in statement in fact in assumption, an astronomical object like Earth or Sun would have effective EM ropes from multiple locations opposite the target object considered. Many pair of atoms between these two objects are in tension with one another at various angles.  The closer they are the steeper the angles of many atoms nudging on one another. 

We can use this assumption that all the atoms of the Universe are connected by an double helix EM thread to make manifest and define inertial mass so that this concept is crisp, clear and used consistently in all physical contexts. For example we could use this definition in context to Einstein's equation. That equation seems to tell us that inertial mass is inseparable from the work of light because we have c squared on the right side of the equation with m. Atoms constantly flickering light signals to and from all atoms via the fundamental physical mediator of light (which connects all atoms) maintains this bi-directional tension necessary to explain inertia. This bi-directional tension maintained by the atom's constant work of light (or radiation) obeys Newton's action-reaction principle. For every radiation the atom performs there is an equal and opposite reaction. From here we could get into Mach's principle. 

E on the left side of Einstein's equation refers to an atom's capacity to do the work of light. All E does is calculate an object's capacity to do the work of light, specifically receive and send off light signals. What is interesting is that the more resistance an object has to being pushed or pulled is proportional to that object's capacity to do the work of light. An exponential increase in an object's 'Energy' or capacity to do the work of light seems to imply that that object has more fundamental and permanent connections to all the atoms of the Universe. So a Caesium atom has more fundamental and permanent connections to all the atoms of the Universe than a Hydrogen atom. 

Matter is an ill-defined concept come out of Greece. 

We could define it as the set of objects, or the set of existing objects.

The fundamental unit of matter is the atom, but there also seems to be an object that is more fundamental connecting all atoms and from which all atoms are derived.  This is an EM Rope or double helix thread.  This object is inseparable to all the base hydrogen atoms (or protons), or in other words the proton assumes its Form or derives its From from this fundamental object. 

Object refers to that which has Form

Exist refers to that which has Form and location OR simply that which stands out.  Atoms and the fundamental object connecting all atoms exists in spite of the fact that the features of the atom (e.g. proton, electron, neutron) as well as the fundamental object has unique properties, such as the ability to superpose, overlap or intersect to a critical density or critical anomaly which initiates fundamental interactions (such as light, push, pull, etc.). 

Mass (Inertial) refers to an an object's resistance to being pushed or pulled by objects in its close vicinity.

Energy refers to an object's capacity to do work (in Einstein's equation the work referred to is distinctly the work of light or radiation)

Monday, March 28, 2016

What is Real?

Real is about as Latin of a word as one can find.
It comes from the Latin realis.

Re is a variation on the Latin word res
alis just means: of, related to, connected with, belonging to

So realis is literally that which is related to things.

Res was a Roman staple, e.g. res publica literally public matter or public things.

In the dictionary they also try a trace Res back to Sanskrit:

"From Proto-Italic *reis, from Proto-Indo-European *reh₁ís (“wealth, goods”). Cognate to Old Persian [script needed] (rāy-, “paradise, wealth”), Avestan (rāy-, “paradise, wealth”) and Sanskrit रयि (rayí, “property, goods”)."

And note that in Latin the spelling RES is the same for singular and plural. So its like res are your things. Your land, your house, your bike, your car, your husband or wife, your body, your children, your money, your clothes, your food supply, and any relation in regards to your things. Your stuff! A very simple down to earth word and much less technical than the other Latin word: Existentia

There are hundreds of English words that use RES, e.g. resurrection, residue, reservoir, residence, etc.

The way the Romans used the word is similar to how people use the English word 'thing' or 'matter' or 'stuff'. In English 'thing' or 'matter' is basically used as a placeholder for any word in an ordinary conversation. But in physics and philosophy these words are used differently and people will be trying to figure this stuff out until the Sun explodes.

If we are to use the word REAL in physics and philosophy then we have to define it.

The Latin is literally that which belongs to things. Thing is just synonymous with object, entity, body, etc. What belongs to all things I ask? Form. Form is the primary quality of all things. So real has a lot to do with form. Form refers to that which is bounded or contained from the immediate surrounding. Then if you want you can add the idea of location. So this form has a location. That star you see every morning has form and location. And guess what? Your act of observing it or thinking about it doesn't determine this. The Sun is just there. It stimulates the atoms in your body and forces you to wake up. Very profound!!! So in real there is this sense that the thing is independent to your thought or act of perception.

Your wife you wake up to every morning has form and location. Once you tie the knot you can't escape her. Your car or bike or skateboard has form and location, that magnet you used in science class has form and location, as do all the atoms that constitute these. HOWEVER that woman you dreamed about last night seemed to have a form but no location. If you look around you will not find her. You can think about her, but you can't relate TO HER. Your brain just generated a picture and made a movie of her. Or that triangle you traced in geometry has a form but no location. Or those spacetime lines your curved don't seem to be found. These forms are not real. They have no relation to all the atoms of the Universe.

So its very simple. The Romans were no fools. They conceived and used words like REALIS and EXISTENTIA because some of their Greek neighbors were insane. These are static concepts used to describe objects.

In philosophy and mathematics they start messing around with the word real and for thousands of years this word is never resolved or defined. And then we have mentally ill philosophers, mathematicians and so called physicists preaching to the masses about the word real. And then they build trillion dollar devices to decide what is real or what is not real because they are confused about how the philosophers use the word real.

All these imaginary problems could be resolved in an instant if the philosopher, physicist or mathematician defined the term REAL and used it consistently in his presentations. Simple as that.

so in summary for physics and philosophy I would define

Real: that which has form (object) and location independent of any human action whether thinking, perceiving, observing, measuring, dreaming, hallucinating, etc. Not all objects qualify as real.

Location & Real vs. Existence

Location refers to a static concept (a picture imaged by the brain). Where form is a primary quality of objects used to resolve the ontology of the word referent, location refers to a sort of secondary quality sometimes used to resolve whether or not an object is real and/or exists.

Real and existence are often used to mean the same, however they are strictly speaking a little different. Real is more down to Earth. A sober concept and has to do more with that which has form independent of any sort of human intervention. Existence is more technical. Existence literally refers to that which STANDS OUT and seems to imply the three classic dimension (length, width, and height). So one could argue that existence implies a human observer. But on the other hand if one has a perfect understanding of the crucial word 'Form' and takes into account mercurial assumptions, I think one can do away with need to toy around so much.

But location can be defined more or less in an observer independent manner so as to resolve whether or not an object is real and/or exists

Location refers to the set of static distances from an object to all other objects.

If an object is described by real or exist, one should hypothetically be able to measure its distance to all objects of the Universe. So if superman is real and/or exists he should be located X distance from the Sun, Y from the Moon, Z from the Earth, A from you and so on. One doesn't have to do the measuring but the basic concept is powerful. It serves as a sound conceptual exercise.

Location can tell you right away whether or not some form is imagined or traced. For example a triangle. A triangle is an object. It has form, HOWEVER. does it have location? And even more 'what' could we possibly imagine bounded or contained of a triangle? In between the boundaries all one does is conceptualize space or some other imaginary forms. Space lacks form. So obviously a triangle is an abstract or imaginary form used in some context of utility. A triangle has nothing to do with reality and/or existence and all to do with a human brain conceptualizing. Similar with all concepts such as love, justice, gravity, etc. These concepts have no form, and neither to they have location. Where are you literally going to find love? Love is what an object does.

Really once one takes on some mercurial assumptions all one needs is Form. But now one can make a list of objects and ask whether or not they have location so as to help resolve whether or not they are real or exist. And so it becomes clear that humans imagine objects, hallucinate objects, project objects unto their environment, trace objects on paper and via computers, dream objects, abstracts objects, idealize objects, hypothesize objects, etc. However none of these can be located and strictly speaking they have no form. Their form also has to be described with the same modifiers. They have imaginary form and so on. We thought of them, we pictured them via our brain and used them to think, but there is no what contained, or bounded from immediate surrounding, no essence, no three classic dimensions, etc. You will never be able to locate a triangle or the ideal woman or superman. None of these objects stand out, none have three dimensions, none of them are connected to all the atoms of the Universe much less constituted by atoms. None of them are qualified in the abstract nest called matter. These imaginary objects have no foundation.

Are Memories Real?

Memory is a brain capacity. The brain or neural objects move to re-image an object of the past or imagine objects collectively mediating an event which happened in the past. The objects used in memory are not real since they lack location or a 'foundation' object from which they derive their form. They are imaginary objects or objects of memory. Just like dream objects or objects in hallucination. In this scenario we could just assume the brain and neural objects or human performing an act of memory are real.

Memory refers to a concept about what an object (brain) is able to do. Memory or memories lack form. There aren't any objects called memories constituting one's brain. Strictly speaking, real describes object. Memory lacks form and so relates back to a concept that we worked out about what our brain is able to do. Thus memory is not object and cannot be described by a static comparison called real. Similar with event. Event lacks form.

REAL is a word that describes and helps to discern objects in our act of understanding and communication.

Naming Our Brain-work

We have the ability to name objects (that which has form) or relation between objects that our brain has worked out.

So in assumption each and every name first and foremost refers to concept. Once we think beyond (or transcend) this assumption then we realize that these nominal conceptions either reference an object (whether real, imaginary, hypothetical, and so on and so forth) or they reference some sort of relation or comparison between objects that our brain has worked out (for example love, gravity, number,) and we decided to label by the act of naming or even tracing. The act of naming always relates the human who named to the object named or the conception conceived and so this is a sort of primal concept. And the criteria for figuring out whether or not a human named an object or a concept is form. This Gottlob Frege never figured out. He had his own complex categories, but his investigations are still useful to borrow from.

But the sort of furtive act in all this is naming our conceptions. We work out a relation or comparison between objects and name this relation. So naming sort of works an affinity between us and our brainwork. We reify our brainwork (that is convert concept into object) and establish a sort of false relation in this. We cannot literally relate to a work our brain consummated so we do a trick by reifying. This is sort of a transcendental if you want. And this is what is confusing I think. Its easy to imagine Adam waking up, discerning that which has form and naming it. But then Adam went to retire for the day and started working out relations between all these objects he named and then he named these relations. The way we can resolve whether or not a word concept relates back to object or concept is form. Does the word referent have form? Yes or no?

Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Naming Our Brain Works

We are able to name objects (that which has form) or to name a relation between objects which our brain has worked out.

In assumption each and every name first and foremost refers to concept. Once we think beyond (or transcend) this assumption we realize that these nominal conceptions either reference an object (whether real, imaginary, hypothetical, and so on and so forth) . . . or they reference some sort of relation or comparison between objects that our brain has worked out (for example love, gravity, number, etc.) and we decided to name. The act of naming always relates the human who named to the object named or the conception conceived and so this is a sort of primal concept. The criteria for figuring out whether or not a human named an object or a concept is form. Form is that which is bounded from an immediate surrounding. This Gottlob Frege never figured out when he said "the concept horse is not a concept". He had his own complex categories, but his investigations are still useful to borrow from.

But the sort of furtive act in all this is naming our conceptions. We work out a relation or comparison between objects and name this relation or comparison. So naming sort of works an affinity between us and our brain-work. We treat our brain-work AS IF this were an object.  In doing so we establish a sort of suprarational relation in this. We cannot literally relate to a work our brain consummated so we do a trick by reifying, that is imagining that this concept is an object and ourselves relating to it. This is sort of a transcendental if you want.  As far as I know animals are not able to accomplish this, and this is one qualifier that sets us apart from the animals.  We are freaks of nature, or children of God made in his image.  Take your pick.  I believe in the latter, but this is irrelevant to the discussion.  

And this is what is confusing I think. Its easy to imagine Adam waking up, and naming that which has form (objects). But then Adam went to retire for the day and started working out relations between all these objects he named and then he named these relations. The way we can resolve whether or not a word concept relates back to object or concept in any given context is form. Does the referent have form? Yes or no?

Blah

I have this concept. . . I call it blah blah blah. Blah, blah, blah, is not a thing. Blah has no form, but I treat blah like a thing in the act of naming, thinking and communication. I reified. I converted this idea into an object. But I just ignore the fact I reified blah blah blah. Now I literally think that blah is an object that performs verbs and is involved in causal relations and undergoes change effects with the Earth, the Sun, the Moon, the stars and all atoms. Blah does it all. Blah is real. And with blah we can work miracles like travel back in time! Blah will take us to new galaxies. With blah we will inhabit new worlds!

But remember blah is just an idea I thought so don't take me too seriously. This is just for shits and giggles, and we make millions off of this concept. And besides we need another trillion dollars of public funds to validate this concept.  And when we do we will announce this to the world, and all wonder.   

Friday, March 4, 2016

Facts vs. Statement of Facts in Assumption

6.2.3.1 A relativist is a person who confuses a fact with the statement of the facts

Like all scientific theories, the Theory of Evolution is comprised of fact and opinion, evidence and theory, and we must learn not to confuse them. The Darwinists confuse finding bones in a given layer of earth (facts and evidence) with their interpretation of the finding (theory, conclusions, and proof). A fossil is evidence of a fact (i.e., that something happened). How long it has been there, why it is there, and whom these remains belong to are either statements of fact or theories, but never facts. Even assuming that Gould and Rennie could convince everyone on Earth that a bone is a million years old, this theory will never become a fact. The reason for this is that theories and facts pertain to different stages of the scientific method. In science, a juror may vote for a theory, but not for a fact. A fact differs from a theory in that it is observer-free and belongs to the hypothesis stage. In Law, a verdict is the fact-finder’s opinion with respect to a fact: a conclusion. In science, there are no ‘triers-of-fact’ or verdicts because facts are strictly part of the assumptions. When we say that it is a fact that this cup is on this table, we are not giving an opinion or asking for a verdict. We are making a statement about a real film clip of the Universal Film. That this cup is on this table is a fact. That you say that this cup is on the table is a statement of the facts: an assumption. Both belong to the hypothesis. Why the cup is on the table (meaning HOW it got there – by what mechanical process) is an issue that belongs either to the hypothesis or to the theory, depending on how the statement is used. You can believe the theory proposed by the prosecutor, but your vote will not retroactively modify what actually occurred (true fact). If God sweeps the floor, it won’t alter the fact that it was dirty a minute ago, even in the case where He wipes the entire incident from everybody’s memory."

(Bill Gaede, From Why God Doesn't Exist)

Gottlob Frege Commentaries

Today I will resurrect some poignant quotes from Frege and others who have studied him. The most important aim to keep in mind with this is that Frege was on the verge of understanding how to resolve the ontology of the nominal referent which is IMHO, THE, if not one of the pinnacles of philosophy, critical thinking and all those good healthy practices expected from a tried intellectual. He didn't quite figure it out, but later another would come up with the way.

Frege Quotes


This is taken from Frege's article titled ‘On Sense and Reference’
Now languages have the fault of containing certain expressions which fail to designate an object (although grammatical form seems to qualify them for that purpose) . . .

Comment: Some words refer to a concept, conceived by a human, however they are surreptitiously used in a syntactical grammar AS IF they refer to objects. Understanding HOW to resolve this distinction is of the utmost important when processing communication ESPECIALLY in a study of fundamental physics. Understanding this distinction will also help lead to an ultimate appreciation of objects and their essential role in brain works.

Continuing Frege says:
So language brands a concept as an object, since the only way it can fit the designation for a concept into its grammatical structure is as a proper name. But in so doing, strictly speaking it falsifies matters. (Gottlob Frege, 1892a, 168-69)

Comment: I would not say it falsifies matters, since validation/verification of statements is another matter that is subjectively performed by humans. I would say in doing so renders that expression irrational, contradictory or at best figurative. Now we treat concepts as if they were objects all the time. This uncanny ability is proper to humans. And yet in a rigorous intellectual setting such as physics, these matters must be clarified for the sake of communication, sanity, consistency, honesty, and helping to produce brilliant, rational assumptions, theories, conclusions, etc.

Quotes from Studies on Frege

From Philosophy of Language and Logical Theory by Khatchadourian (p.309-11)
A concept-word, according to Frege, is predicative; it is a possible grammatical predicate of a range of otherwise different sentences. To predicate a concept-word of a grammatical subject is to relate a concept to a logical subject, i.e. to an object. Another way of saying this is that to predicate a concept of an object is to state that the object falls under the concept. The predicative character of concepts is what Frege calls “incompleteness” of concepts. In terms of this the difference between a concept and an object is that an object falls under a concept but that the converse is impossible. “An equation is reversible; an object’s falling under a concept is irreversible

Comment: So concepts are based in objects. Frege never figured out why: objects have form, concepts lack form; they are relations between two or more objects worked out by the brain. Concepts are based on objects, but objects are not based on concepts. An object has the referent of Form independent of our conception or even perception. The referent of Form is inseparable from an object. So for example the form of that object across the street named woman does not rely on our seeing it or on our naming it ‘woman’. Now this might sound trite or petty semantics but I assure everyone that understanding how to resolve the ontology of word referent in all contexts can help enable one to accomplish immense intellectual tasks for example:

1. Ability to discern and interpret figures of speech, and perhaps learning how to conceive of one’s own figures
2. Ability to interpret obscure and difficult texts, etc.
3. Ability to understand the roots of all languages. All languages have their roots in objects.
4. Identifying intellectual charlatans who make millions even billions off of concepts that refer to nothing in reality
5. Enabling one to see through intellectual hogwash and acquire a sort of natural wisdom.
6. Initiating intellectual revolutions in self and others
7. Appreciating the great value of existing objects and understanding that a dynamic concept such as love will never happen or even be conceived without that object named woman who grew up down the road from you. Thus one would imagine that this woman is very valuable and should be treated with great care and dignity. Understanding that without the two objects named man and woman and what they have the ability to do continues the human family. Understanding that objects such as food, clothes, water, house are more valuable than concepts such as money.
8. Understanding the great darkness and devolution of Western Civilization as it currently operates. Many are enslaved to, burdened and lost in the concepts conceived by themselves or others.
9. Understand how people manipulate each other via use of concepts.
10. Tracing back to the fundamental object that underlies and connects all existing atoms of the Universe and understanding that this fundamental object cannot possibly rely on a concept called space for its form.
11. Figuring out devishly difficult problems in physics such as what object may mediate gravity and light between stars and planet, how atoms work, what electron, proton, and neutron refer to, what sort of assumptions can we make about the fundamental entity, explaining fundamental interactions, exposing the wave-particle duality, balancing the continuity of all objects with their discontinuity, and so on.
12. Enable one to attain freedom of thought.

Continuing with Frege Study:
It seems to follow from this that “completing” a concept can be regarded as stating that a given object falls or does not fall under the concept. We “complete” ‘() conquered Gaul’ by ‘Julius Caesar’, when we state that Julius Caesar falls under the concept conquered Gaul, i.e. when we make the statement ‘Julius Caesar conquered Gaul’.

Comment. We base the concept ‘conquered Gaul’ on Julius Caesar. Without the referent of Julius Caesar the conquering of Gaul would have never happened. Frege took a sort of . . . how do I want to say this . . . backwards approach to solving these problems.
. . .
Concepts are attributes. Hence what we have said about the “incompleteness” of concepts, put in terms of this notion, is that attributes are “incomplete” in isolation from objects. Another way of saying this is that attributes, in order to be attributes at all, have to be attributes of objects. An attribute is “completed” when it is related to an object, is thought of as attributed to the object [objects precede concepts]. Relations [also concepts], which are in a similar position, are functions with two arguments, i.e. are doubly “incomplete”, and so require two objects to be “completed”. Speaking about concepts Frege says:
"It is clear that a concept cannot be represented independently as an object can but that it can occur only in combination. One can say that a concept can be distinguished out of it. All apparent contradictions which one can come upon here result from treating a concept as an object, contrary to its incomplete nature. (Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie)"
Black says that this suggests that Frege’s contention that functions (and so concepts) are “incomplete” is that “it is logically impossible to make a function the subject of an assertion” (p. 246).

Comment: Obviously attributes and relations lack form and cannot possibly exist. Attributes and relations refer to our thoughts about objects. Attribute refers to a comparison of objects. What does this thing have or not have in comparison to that thing. What can this thing do that another cannot do.  
Attribute is a subcategory of concept.  Once we establish a category Concept by resolving the ontology of the word-referent i.e. asking whether or not the referent has form, we see that one can modify the Concept category into many subcategories.

So, concepts refer to a relation between two or more objects worked out by the brain. A concept is 'incomplete' without a minimum of at least two objects since one of those objects is the man conceiving the relation or at least two neurons consummating the relation in the brain of the man.

Frege began to understand the hierarchical relation between objects and concepts. Objects precede concepts. Without objects there would be no events (moving relations, syn: phenomena, happening, etc), no perceptions completed by sense organs of humans, animals and possibly plant, no conceptions completed by the brain, no verbs, etc. Verbs refer to what we think objects do. The woman sings . . . stars illuminate and gravitate. How they do this is a matter of explanation and we may have to suppose an un-perceivable object such as air or invisible mediators so as to explain the action. But it is contradictory to make a verb or a grammatical function the subject of a sentence because then it is treated as an object. Verbs, attributes, or relations CANNOT perform actions or reactions. Objects perform causal relations and undergo change effects via objects and this makes our conception of verbs possible and it is rational to acknowledge this order.

With objects all we can possibly do is name them, assume them, draw them and explain how they work in relation to other objects. Naming refers to a dynamic concept completed by a human and can be traced directly to the object that is named (to that which has Form). We also have the tricky ability to perform the work of naming our conceptions, our brainworks. We name our brain works, to organize, develop and stimulate our brains and also so as to communicate directly with other objects such as humans and animals. Naming concepts modifies objects, describes them, etc. This name can indirectly trace back to the objects of our brains (atoms, electrons, neurons, connectors, etc.) performing causal relations and undergoing change effects in the referred concept or to objects of our environment remembered and used in the conception. The name of our conception serves as a placeholder for the objects of our environment we conceived in a relation via our sensory organ or the objects of our brain performing the work called conception and serves to modify, describe, explain the objects. So we perceive water molecules, remember their locations, think and name that thought wave. Wave is what an object does. Wave does not refer to an object. We can trace back wave to objects even if these objects are no longer perceivable or even unperceivable.

If we conceive an abstract concept such as Universe then we can trace back that abstraction to a nest of all existing objects and the static separation we conceived (space). If we do not at least make note of this, then we may begin to think that our conceptions literally have form and perform causal relations and undergo change effects when clearly this is impossible because our conceptions are already the objects of our brains performing causal relations and undergoing change effects. And bye the bye, we are always conceiving. So naming our conception is sort of a convenient illusion to stimulate our brains, understand and communicate. It is the goal of intellectual life to master this stimulation and not become a slave to this work or use this work to deceive others, lord it over others, or swindle others.

But the reverse is impossible. An object cannot possibly refer to or resolve to a concept.

Our intellectual activities better end on objects that have forms and hopefully exist. In a strict intellectual environment objects should never be used as a concept or vice versa: Concepts should not be treated as objects. When all is said and done, two or more objects induce concepts or make concepts possible. Frege took a sort of negative approach and never completely solved the problem because he failed to understand that Form resolves the ontology of the word referent (does the nominal referent have Form? Yes or No???) Form is the most important name in all philosophy. It is in a category all its own. The Sun, Moon, Stars, atoms, the fundamental object underlying all atoms and the woman or man across the street all had their unique Form and performed their actions before you saw them, remembered them or thought about them.

Frege also wrote an article "On Concept and Object" (1892a) where he struggles with the contradiction that "the concept horse is not a concept". Had he known how to resolve the ontology of the word referent he would have solved some of his own problems.

All names, first and foremost refer to conceptions, verbs, or brain-works performed by a human. Its what we do! These either directly refer to an Object (that which has Form) or indirectly to two or more objects embodied by the brain in a relation with the aim of understanding, communication, praxis, organization, etc, in other words Concept.

Syntax follows this rational order, however for whatever reason, because we are free, i.e. not bound by artificial laws of syntax or of logic, because we are creative, or because we are freaks of Nature or children of God, we break these laws all the time and switch the order treating referred concepts AS IF they were objects. Thus we need to parse sentences and discern communication so as to make sense of what the author meant to convey. In other words we resolve the context. If the author is confused we should be able to figure this out rather quickly by using these conceptual tools at our disposal.

From object, form, and concept we can graduate to exist. Exist refers to an object that stands out. Exist implies three dimensions (length, width, height) however these are measurements and whether or not an object exists has nothing to do with our act of measuring. The Sun had Form and existed before any human came along to observe it and measure it. Another possible definition of exist is that which has Form and Location. With this enlightened understanding we can clearly see that 1D, 2D, 4D objects of geometry cannot possibly exist or be used in assumptions, explanations and conclusions in physics. Geometry is a nihilistic religion.

Concept lacks Form and so is automatically disqualified from existence. This does not entail that Concept does not HAPPEN, however these dynamic concepts must ALWAYS be performed or worked by objects that exist.